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In the oil and gas industry, many operating expenses assigns to the cost of inspection and 
maintenance. Therefore, an optimized inspection strategy can reduce the cost of inspection and 
maintenance when the system's integrity does not change. One of the inspection's main issues is 
providing the right balance between the benefits of inspection and the inspection cost. It has led to 
the emerging of a new concept of inspection called risk-based inspection (RBI). This is based on 
the logical view that most high-risk equipment is concentrated within a small portion of the plant. 
Therefore, this equipment has priority for inspection, and the extra cost could be decreased with 
reduced inspection for other equipment with lower risk. Different risk-based inspection approaches 
have been accepted and developed in the petroleum industry in the past few years. However, there 
is not any integrated approach for RBI. In this research, to minimize the inspection cost, a new 
risk-based methodology has been developed by employing the Bayesian Network. Therefore, this 
study started with the most common risk analysis techniques such as fault tree and event tree and 
then tried to present a Bayesian network that can deal better with uncertainty. The critical point is 
that the BN model has met the RBI principle, which required increasing inspection for high-risk 
equipment to ensure safety level. On the other hand, it makes balance in the cost by reducing the 
inspection for low-risk equipment. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Industrial accidents are not a new issue for humankind, and they are as old as the emerged of 
industry. Therefore, many standards and procedures have been developed to reduce the impacts of 
these hazards. Explosion and fire are two historical and well-known types of these mishaps. They 
can create major accidents or minor incidents base on their source and the environment. Fire is a 
rapid oxidation-reduction reaction that results in the production of heat and generally visible light. 
An explosion is an extreme and sudden expansion of gas combustion. An explosion can create a 
loud, sharp noise and a supersonic shock wave with a powerful and destructive force (Bottrill et al. 
2005). A spark in a hazardous environment can create fire or explosion. This can happen in any 
place where flammable and radioactive materials are processed or stored because there is potential 
for leakage or the ability to create an explosive atmosphere in conjunction with oxygen from air or 
some oxidizing agent. Therefore, three main elements for the explosion are Fuel (any flammable 
material), Oxygen, and an ignition source (Bottrill et al. 2005). 
Indubitably, nowadays, the wheel of the production process in any industry is electricity. Electricity 
creates a spark that generates energy, and this nature can lead to ignition or explosion where there 
is an explosive atmosphere. By the advent of the Industrial Revolution and subsequent industrial 
development in the twentieth century, the chemistry of electricity has been known as one of the 
critical ignition sources in different industries (Bottrill et al. 2005). 
The first safeguard approach against fire and explosion in the production process has been used in 
discovering and extracting mines to reduce the risk of burning methane gas. Methane is lighter than 
air; therefore, it moves up and amasses near the roof in mines. In this initial method, some expert 
miners covered with wet sacking were entering the working area with lanterns in front of other 
miners. Changing the lanterns' fire color was a sign of the existence of methane (Bottrill et al. 
2005).  
Other risks were identified by emerging electricity and using it in the mining industry, and the need 
for control equipment appeared. Safety equipment introduced by the mining industry was 
developed in other sectors to control the risk of flaming or explosion. In the early 1900s, the first 





codes and standards for using electric equipment have introduced in the USA. Finally, the 
International Electrical Commission (IEC) was founded in Switzerland (Bottrill et al. 2005). 
1.1 Research question 
The international electrical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for the standardization 
and coding of all electrical/electronic equipment and related technologies. IEC 60079 describes 
general requirements for Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment (Ex) on selection, installation, 
maintenance, and inspection in hazardous areas such as drilling rigs. Following this standard, IEC 
60079-17 covers factors directly related to the inspection and maintenance of electrical installations 
within hazardous areas only, where flammable gases may cause the hazard, vapors, mists, dust, 
fibers, or flying (IEC Webstore, 2021). 
Inspection is known as a critical tool to detect potential failures. So, Inspection of Ex electrical 
equipment is essential to ensure the continuing integrity of the types of protection that enable its 
use in potentially explosive atmospheres. Yet, such inspections are sometimes not carried out 
adequately regarding the frequency of inspection, grade of inspection, and completeness of the 
portfolio of Ex electrical equipment installed. Today, many inspections of Ex electrical equipment 
are carried out at the same level without adjustment for the different ignition risks that might apply. 
Still, Ex electrical equipment is typically located in various hazardous areas (where the probability 
of a flammable atmosphere being present differs). Also, different EX equipment presents different 
ignition risks based on the concept of EX protection type. In addition, the equipment may have 
different ages or be located where the environmental conditions differ (EI guideline, 2008).  
One of the inspection's main issues is providing the right balance between the benefits of inspection 
and the inspection cost. It has led to the emerging of a new concept of inspection called risk-based 
inspection (RBI). This is based on the logical view that most high-risk equipment is concentrated 
within a small portion of the plant. Therefore, this equipment has priority for inspection, and the 
extra cost could be decreased with reduced inspection for other equipment with lower risk (Bhatia 
et al. 2019). 
RBI has been defined as "an integrated methodology that uses risk as a basis for prioritizing and 
managing an in-service equipment inspection program by combining both the likelihood of failure 





and the consequence of failure." (EI guideline, 2008). As is apparent in the RBI definition, two 
critical factors in this approach are the probability of failure (PoF) and the consequence of failure 
(CoF). Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to develop a risk-based inspection strategy for 
Ex electrical equipment ignition risk in support of standards and regulation by applying the 
Bayesian network. To this end, this study looks closer at two following research questions: 
- RQ1: How to apply a Bayesian Network to estimate the PoF and CoF regarding the EX 
risk-based inspection (EXRBI)? 
- RQ2: How the result of the Bayesian Network can apply to develop a risk-based inspection 
strategy of Ex electrical equipment in the Rowan Viking rig? 
This research has been done in cooperation with the IKM Elektro As according to EX equipment 
installed in the Rowan Viking rig. 
1.2. IKM Elektro AS 
IKM group is one of the Norwegian international leading companies in the oil and gas industry, 
and IKM Elektro AS is a subsidiary company of the IKM group (ikm.com, 2021). Figure 1.1 shows 
the IKM Elektro information such as revenue, employees, office area, etc.   
Figure 1.1: General information for IKM Elektro AS 
Source: IKM website 





IKM Elektro AS provides services in different fields as follow (ikm.com, 2021): 
- Ex-elektro service includes temporary installations, Ex inspection, Demolition and 
removal, operation service, and maintenance. 
- Motor service includes condition check of motor, motor overhaul/repair, motor inspection, 
and sale of motors. 
- High Voltage Services includes installation, maintenance, and operation of electrical high 
voltage installations. 
- Offshore/Onshore Service Personnel. IKM Elektro uses skilled experts to handle and 
supervise planned resources, personnel, competence matrixes, and course certificates for 
baseline, skilled staff, commissioning, and decommissioning projects. 







Figure 1.2: IKM Elektro's inspection process. 
Source: Documents from IKM Elektro As. 
For each customer, IKM Elektro registers data of equipment to find more information for PoF and 
CoF. After register data, the data will be "washed" and sorted to present the correct data; this 
information plays a central role in the assessment. Then, they do analysis and propound the 
checklists and intervals which will be used for inspection. 





This company uses digital tools for inspection (i.e., "Inspectio" or equivalent software solution) to 
ensure high-quality reports in the RBI analysis. The software sends checklists to the inspection and 
receives data back after the inspection. IKM Elektro board of directors determined the Rowan 
Viking rig (figure 1.3) as the case study for this thesis and provided access to inspection data for 
this study. 
 
Figure 1.3: The Rowan Viking rig 
Source: https://www.ptil.no 
The Rowan Viking is an 11-year-old jack-up rig for drilling offshore wells, which complies with 
Norwegian law. Today this rig is located at UKC - North Sea at position 58° 50' 29.652" N, 2° 14' 
50.039" E (marinetraffic, 2021). Table 1.1 presents information for this rig. 
 
Name ROWAN VIKING CRANES 1 PTC 35
IMO  8769664 TRANSPORT 18 axle lines of SPMT
Vessel Type - Detailed Platform MARITIME EQUIPMENT 1sheerleg &1 barge
Status Active CREW 11 Mammoet professionals
MMSI 538004075 Dimension 80 x 10 m
Flag Marshall Is [MH] Year Built 2010
Table 1.1: General information for The Rowan Viking rig
Source:https://www.marinetraffic.com

























Chapter 1 starts with the introduction, then 1.1 presents the research question,1.2 
includes a brief presentation of the case study, and 1.3 contains the thesis structure. 
Chapter 2 reviews relevant theoretical concepts. Section one of this chapter takes a 
look at basic concepts of risk analysis. 2.2 presents relevant theories according to 
RBI, and 2.3 introduces the Bayesian risk assessment. 
Chapter 2 is assigned to methodology. 3.1 presents research strategy and design, 3.2 
is about data collection, section 3.3 defines the methodology for converting from fault 
tree and event tree to the Bayesian network, 3.4 presents risk matrix, and 3.5 is 
assigned to reliability and validity. 
Chapter 4 includes empirical data analysis. In 4.1, data has been analyzed to identify 
fault mechanisms for EX equipment; then, in 4.2, a primary Bayesian network has 
been developed. 
The discussion about the result of the analysis has taken place in chapter 5, where 5.1 
discusses how the primary model could be updated, 5.2 identifies acceptance criteria, 
5.3 defines the concept of lots, and finally, 5.4 shows the application of The BN for 
inspection strategy bay an example from The Rowan Viking rig. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusion of the thesis, where some recommendations have 
been suggested. 





Chapter 2. Related Literature and Theoretical Perspective 
This chapter introduces some key concepts and theories related to risk-based inspection based on 
current industrial practice. 
2.1 Concept of risk analysis  
It is essential to make a difference between risk definition and describing the risk. Different 
researchers have present various definitions for risk.  When we speak about the risk, something 
threatens the critical values (i.e., human life, environment). Usually, people use the word risk in a 
negative sense. But the point is that we do not know the consequences so, we do not classify the 
consequences as positive or negative. Therefore, the risk may consider an opportunity. This thesis 
generally defines risk as: “the consequences (C) of the activity (A) and associated uncertainties 
(U).” (Aven, 2020). 
Risk= (A, C, U) or briefly (C, U)  
The same as the risk definition, there are different methods to describe risk and measure its 
potential. For instance, consider initiating event A as gas leakage; As it is clear, some other 
concepts and elements are relevant to the risk of an event (A) like barriers, risk sources, safety, 
hazard, and vulnerability. Therefore, risk description needs to provide understanding about these 
concepts as well. Consequently, this thesis describes risk generally as: “The triplet (C’, Q, K), 
where C’ is some specified consequences, Q a measure of uncertainty associated with C’ (typically 
probability), and K the background knowledge that supports C’ and Q (which includes a judgment 
of the strength of this knowledge)” (Aven, 2020). 
Risk description = (C’, Q, K) 
To describe risk as above provides the possibility of developing other concepts for risk assessment. 
For instance, we can extend the definition of risk with the concepts of vulnerability and threat as: 
Risk = (A, U, C) = (A, U) + (C, U|A)  
 (A, U) present hazard and associated uncertainties, and (C, U|A) present vulnerability. That means 
vulnerability is consequences conditional on the occurrence of event A.  





And Risk description = (C’, Q, K) = (A’, Q, K) + (C’, Q, K|A’).  
Where risk is described as the combination of the uncertainty associated with the hazard and the 
vulnerability given the occurrence of the specific event A’ (Aven, 2020). 
Regardless of how risk is defined, the standard features of risk in all definitions are consequence 
C and uncertainty (possibility) U because of event A (Aven, 2020). Therefore, the risk analysis 
first needs to identify the relevant initiating events (A) and then develop the causal and 
consequence picture to determine where critical values are at stake. Risk analysis aims to provide 
an informative risk picture by describing risk. Figure 2.1 illustrates an example of a simple bowtie 
diagram, providing the main blocks of the risk picture (Aven, 2015). 
 
Figure 2.1: An example of bowtie diagram (based on Aven, 2008). 
The left side of the bowtie describes the causal picture that may cause event A and introduces 
barriers to prevent event A. It is common to use the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for this part. The 
right side illustrates the possible consequences of A and mitigation measures, where The Event 
Tree Analysis (ETA) is the most common method (Aven, 2015).  
It is crucial to make a difference between the term “risk analysis process” and risk assessment. The 
risk picture, which is established by risk analysis, provides a basis for comparing different 
alternatives and solutions. Risk analysis supports decision-making to provide input for risk 
evaluation. Then combination of risk analysis and risk evaluation navigates the basis for risk 
assessment (Aven, 2015). The risk analysis process includes three main phases: planning, risk 
assessment, and risk treatment. The risk analysis process covers principles and fundamental 





concepts for risk assessment, risk perception, risk communication, and risk management to solve 
risk issues (Aven, 2020). 
Nowadays, managing risk against health, safety, and environment (HSE) is one of the essential 
subjects in the oil and gas industry. The main object of HSE is to provide a safe workplace where 
there is minimum life cycle cost. Therefore, risk analysis has become growingly recognized as an 
effective tool for this matter (Bai & Jin, 2015). 
Risk management includes all measures and activities to manage risk. Risk management tries to 
balance development and protection. Various risk management strategies (i.e., risk-informed, 
cautionary, resilience, etc.) are used for this matter. One of the most common strategies in the 
petroleum industry is the risk-based strategy based on codes and standards (Aven, 2020).  
Figure 2.2: ISO 31000 risk management process 
Source: Iso 3100 
In most cases, the risk management process divided into several steps. Figure 2.2 illustrates ISO 
31000 risk management process. 
2.2. Risk-based inspection 
In the oil and gas industry, many operating expenses assigns to the cost of inspection and 
maintenance. Therefore, an optimized inspection strategy can reduce the cost of inspection and 
maintenance when the system's integrity does not change.  





Risk-based inspection is a precious tool to design and optimize an inspection strategy, which uses 
risk assessment to determine priorities of inspection activities based on the historical data, 
analytical methods, and experts' judgment (Bai et al., 2014). 
RBI considers the consequences and probability of failure from specific degradation mechanisms 
then develop an inspection strategy that will effectively reduce the associated risk of loss. However, 
RBI is still a developing approach. Various RBI methodologies are available, and each of them has 
its advantages and disadvantages (Bai et al., 2014). 
As illustrated in figure 2.3, a risk-based inspection process follows four steps: system definition, 
quantitative risk assessment, risk analysis application, and development of inspection strategy (Bai 
& Jin, 2015).  
Figure 2.3. Risk-based inspection process (based on Bai & Jin, 2015). 





The RBI's process starts with definition of the system, define a risk, and identify acceptance criteria 
(Bai & Jin, 2015). The system's detailed study includes a general description of the system’s 
structure and operation, the functional relationship between the elements of the system, and any 
other system constraints. Therefore first, the relevant failure modes should be recognized. By 
identification of the failure modes, the risk of failure could be assessed by estimating the probability 
and consequence of the failure modes based on the acceptable level. Then the inspection and 
measures could be used to ensure the level of risk would not dominate the level of acceptance 
criteria. In the RBI process, risk acceptance criteria should be established first to compare in risk 
analysis (Bai et al., 2014). 
RBI defines risk as to the product of the probability of failure (PoF) and the consequence of failure 
(CoF): Risk= PoF x CoF. Risk matrices could calculate the result for the components and provide 
the risk picture (Bai et al., 2014).  
As a result, risk assessment is a vital part of the RBI process (Bai & Jin, 2015). According to Aven 
(2020), risk assessment is the systematic process to identify risk sources, threats, hazards, and 
opportunities; understanding how these can occur, what their consequences can be; representing 
and expressing uncertainties and risk and determine the significance of the risk using relevant 
criteria. The assessments help us identify what might go wrong, why and how it might go wrong, 
the consequences, and how bad they are. Risk assessment is in many ways a conventional approach, 
with suitable methods and models for responding to such questions and issues, founded to a large 
extent on probabilistic and statistical thinking and tools. Probability theory and other frameworks 
represent, model, and treat variation and uncertainties; statistics and Bayesian analysis provide 
essential risk assessment tools. 
Analysis of the initiating events and identify the possible causes for them provide the best basis to 
recognizing measures that may prevent undesirable consequences. POF and COF can be estimated 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. The most common methods are (Bai & Jin, 2015):  
• Historical data  
• Fault tree analysis  





• Event tree analysis  
• FMEA  
• Human reliability analysis  
However, one of the popular methods to analyze the failure causes of engineering systems and 
safety-critical systems is fault tree analysis and could be used both qualitative and quantitative. 
Figure 2.4 shows an example for the FT. 
Figure 2.4: FT graphical model example. Provided by this study. 
FTA is a top/down approach and first identifies the expected undesired event of the system as a top 
event; then, the tree diagram is refined layer by layer from leading events to causes until the primary 
cause of the system failure is reached. Events in an FTA diagram are statistically independent, and 
PoF for each event is based on the distribution of the random variable for the event, X1= {U1, U2, 
U3 … Un} (Bobbio et al, 2001). 
Relationships between events and causes represent through logical gates, and these logical gates 
could be shown by different symbols, as is shown in figure 2.5 (Casal, 2017). 






Figure 2.5: Most common symbols used in fault trees (Casal, 2017). 
Event trees (ET) is the most common method to analyze the consequences of each accident scenario 
and estimate their likelihood. Figure 2.6 illustrates an example for ET (Casal, 2017). 
 
Figure 2.6: The structure of the event tree (Casal, 2017). 
The consequence sequence is concerning the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the intermediate 
events. Therefore, an ET starts with the initiating event and then, the sequence's progress according 
to a binary (success/failure) mode (Casal, 2017). In RBI usually, consequences are divided into 
three segmentation of safety, economic, and environmental (Bai & Jin, 2015). 





As mentioned earlier, the risk is defined as R= f (C, U). In RBI, it is common to use probabilistic 
risk analysis (PRA) to calculate PoF and CoF. Bayesian models are often applied to reliability 
updating for probability-based inspection planning. Therefore, according to the RBI perspective, 
R=f (Pf, C), where Pf is the failure probability; C is the consequence of the failure. A more general 
expression of the risk for practical calculation is given by R=∑ (Pfi. Ci). The risk-based inspection 
can be planned by minimizing the risk: min{R} (Bai & Jin, 2015). 
The risk picture could be provided by a matrix of CoF and PoF categories. Usually, a 5 x 5 risk 
matrix are used as shown in figure 2.7 (Bai et al, 2014). 
Figure 2.7: Example of RBI risk matrix (Bai et al, 2014). 
The vertical axis presents PoF, and CoF is indicated on the horizontal axis. In the matrix table, the 
risk has three levels: low risk (usually is shown with green color), medium risk (usually is yellow), 
and high risk (red color), and the risk increases from the low level at the left-bottom corner to the 
high level at the right-top corner. Usually, low and medium risks could be acceptable based on the 
acceptance criteria. High risk is unacceptable, and action must be taken to reduce the probability, 
consequence, or both to ensure that risk lies within the acceptable region (Bai et al, 2014). 
Therefore, the risk acceptance criterion defines the overall risk level. The criteria are a reference 
for evaluating the need for risk-reducing measures, and therefore need to be defined before 





initiating the risk analysis. Additionally, the risk acceptance criteria must reflect the safety 
objectives and the distinctive characteristics of the activity. There are different methods for 
identifying acceptance criteria (Bai et al., 2014): 
-  High-level criteria for quantitative studies  
- Risk matrices and the ALARP principle  
- Risk comparison criteria 
The ALARP (“as low as reasonably practicable”) principle is sometimes used in the oil and gas 
industry (figure 2.8). The use of the ALARP principle may be interpreted as satisfying a 
requirement to keep the risk level “as low as possible” provided that the ALARP evaluations are 
extensively documented (Aven, 2020). 
 
Figure 2.8: The AlARP triangle (Bai & Jin, 2015) 
Between “lower tolerable limit” and “tolerable upper limit,” the risk is tolerable when risk 
reduction is impracticable, or the cost for reducing the risk is grossly disproportionate to the 
improvement gained (Bai & Jin, 2015). 





2.3 Bayesian risk assessment 
Today, the Bayesian risk assessment method is employed in various domains for many different 
stochastic modeling situations. The basis of many traditional risk analyses, especially in the 
engineering field, has been based on probabilistic risk analysis (PRA).  As mentioned earlier, 
engineering systems usually use deterministic models such as ETA and FT and logically relate 
low-level events to the higher-level event. The occurrence of initiating events and system failures 
in the fault trees and event trees is modeled probabilistically. The associated probabilistic models 
contain one or more parameters whose values are known only with uncertainty (Kelly & Smith, 
2011). Figure 2.9 shows the structure of risk assessment according to a classic risk analysis 
approach. 
 
Figure 2.9: Structure of risk assessment according to a classic risk analysis approach (provided by this study based 
on Kelly & smith, 2011). 
The classical risk analysis approach with uncertainty assessment allows uncertainty in the 
parameters to be expressed as subjective probability distributions to quantify uncertainty. 
Probability is perceived as a measure of our belief in the outcome of the experiment. It measures 
an uncertainty about future events and effects seen by an analysis group or an analyst. The Bayesian 
approach has given background information and knowledge, with probability as a subjective 
measure of uncertainty for predicting the future. Bayesian methods to estimate parameters with 
associated uncertainty use all available information, leading to informed decisions based upon the 
applicable information at hand (Kelly & Smith, 2011). 
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Figure 2.10 shows the structure of risk assessment according to a Bayesian risk analysis approach. 
 
Figure 2.10: Structure of risk assessment according to a Bayesian risk analysis approach (provided by this study 
based on Kelly & smith, 2011). 
The Bayesian risk analysis approach focuses on the system's future performance and certain 
variables that reflect system Y's performance. Based on the analyst's understanding of the world, 
one or more models are developed related to Y to X's general performance goal. The analyst then 
assesses X. Using a probability calculation, the uncertainty assessment of X, together with model 
f, will give the result of the analysis. This will be the probability distribution of Y, which can be 
deduced from a prediction of y. The critical difference and critical point of the Bayesian method 
are about uncertainty. Uncertainty is now a significant risk analysis component. But traditional risk 
analysis does not care about this vital factor. The Bayesian method could be used to estimate risk 
distribution, and it could be used as a tool to select or parameterize input distributions for a risk 
model (Kelly & Smith, 2011). 
According to Kelly & Smith (2011), some advantages of The Bayesian methods could be as follow: 
- By redefining probability as a subjective quantity rather than a measure of limiting 
frequencies, Bayesians can compute “credibility intervals” to characterize the uncertainty 
about parameter estimates. 
- It is excellent for visualization of problem domains/risk pictures (causal interactions, risk 
drivers, and barriers) 
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- It supports constructive discussions on risk. 
- It is a systematic approach for combining knowledge from different sources (Historical data 
and expert input, Knowledge from different experts) 
- It easily updates with new knowledge. 
- It is excellent for modeling dependencies. 
- It allows peeking at the data. 
- It is possible to guarantee that decisions are sensible in that they meet the axioms of 
coherent decision theory by expressing all uncertainties with probabilities and employing 
the Bayesian approach. 
Bayes’ Theorem provides the mathematical means of combining information and data to update a 
prior state of knowledge in the context of a probabilistic model. This theorem modifies a prior 
probability, yielding a posterior probability, via the expression (Kelly & Smith, 2011):  
P(H|D) = P(H) 
- P(H|D) Posterior distribution, which is conditional upon the data D that is known related 
to the hypothesis H. 
- P(H) Prior distribution, from knowledge of the hypothesis H that is independent of data 
D. 
- P(D|H) Likelihood, or aleatory model, representing the process or mechanism that 
provides data D. 
- P(D) Marginal distribution, which serves as a normalization constant. 
One of the Bayesian risk assessment approaches that have received more attention in the past few 
years is The Bayesian Network (BN).  Bayesian networks (figure 2.11) are acyclic directed graphs 
in which nodes represent random variables and arcs demonstrate the causal relationship between 
two variables (Abbasi, 2016). 
P(D|H) 
P(D) 





Figure 2.11: The graphical example of the Bayesian network (the figure is provided by this study). 
Every node could come from some parent nodes and present some children nodes. In BN nodes are 
conditional dependent on each other. This feature is of the important advantages of BN because 
provides the possibility for cause-effect analysis. Nodes without any parents can be considered root 
nodes, and marginal prior probabilities are assigned to root nodes (Bian, 2021). 
Usually, random variables for each node in a BN, Z= {X1, X2 ... Xn}, are discrete; however, it is 
possible to formalize some form of continuous random variables as well. The arrows between the 
two nodes indicate causal probabilistic between them. So, each node has a Conditional Probability 
Table (CPT) that contain all conditional probabilities of all combination of values of the node and 
parent nodes. The number of combinations for n variables could be 2n. As a result, a BN represents 
the joint distribution of variables Z= {X1, X2 ... Xn} and P(Z) by the following formula (Bobbio, 
2001):  
 
By achieved new knowledge such as new data, new information, or expert judgment in the 
operational life cycle of a process, which is called evidence (M), the probability P(Z) could be 
update based on Bayes theorem (Bobbio, 2001): 
 





Chapter 3. Methodology 
This chapter aims to introduce the research methodology for this semi-qualitative study regarding 
developing and managing an inspection program for Ex electrical equipment ignition risk in 
support of IEC 60079-17 and a risk-based inspection strategy.  
3.1. Research strategy and design 
This study used a mix- method approach, based on both quantitative and qualitative approach data 
gathering. Quantitative vs. qualitative, descriptive vs. analytical, and conceptual vs. empirical are 
only examples of different research methods, which can be used in risk analysis. Therefore, 
choosing the proper methodology is very important for the success of RBI.  Qualitative, 
quantitative, and semiquantitative methods are three different approaches that are commonly used 
in the RBI process (Bai et al. 2014). 
A qualitative method usually uses an engineering judgment-based approach for risk assessment. In 
this approach, the failure probability is based on qualitative rankings of PoF and CoF. Therefore, 
the results present a rough estimation because of the consideration of few essential data. In a 
qualitative method, analysts do not calculate a numerical value, using descriptive ranking such as 
low, medium, or high.  Quickly assessment process with a low initial cost, no many requirements 
for detailed information, and accessible presentation and understanding results can be named as 
advantages for RBI qualitative method (Bai et al. 2014).  
Since the 1970s, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) has been started in the nuclear industry as 
the basis for supporting risk-related decisions. Quantitative methods are model-based approaches. 
QRA calculated the risk by probability tools and expresses metrics for PoF and Cof based on 
computing probabilities for the events, scenarios, and related outcomes (Bai et al. 2014). 
Quantitative risk assessment required more data, so a much more comprehensive database presents 
more reliability where the PoF value can be evaluated by structural reliability and well-published 
numerical consequence modeling support CoF value. For instance, PLL (Potential Loss of Lives) 
expresses the expected number of fatalities in terms of indices for an individual risk, and the 
expected number of accidents can be presented by FAR (Fatal Accident Rate) and f-n curves (Aven, 
2020). 





As mentioned in section 2.1, this study describes risk as specified consequences with associated 
uncertainty (typically probability) and the background knowledge that supports consequences and 
uncertainty. It is essential to consider that QRA is based on some knowledge, which could be more 
or less strong and also wrong. Knowledge is not objective; it is inter-subjective among experts. The 
main aim of using different research methodologies is to provide knowledge by the most justified 
representation. How can be represented uncertainties is the crucial point and most important issue 
in risk analysis. Experiments, case studies, questionnaires, interviews, simulation, various 
statistical methods, etc., can be used as a tool for this matter, and any tool has limitations and should 
be adopted. In risk analysis, the metrics' knowledge also needs to be considered and explain what 
probability's results mean; therefore, risk cannot be characterized only by numbers (Aven, 2020).  
As a result, choosing a purely quantitative or qualitative approach brings challenges to representing 
and treating all types of risks and uncertainties. Semiquantitative methods use more information 
and calculations to solve this problem, and results can be more accurate (Bai et al. 2014). Therefore, 
this thesis used the semiquantitative approaches, which are widely used in RBI. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the main steps of this thesis. 
 
Figure 3.1. The research structure (provided by this study). 





After the field of research is identified and research questions have been developed, relevant 
theories defined which type of research could be more appropriate. Then, all available and relevant 
data have been collected based on the research design. Data have been sorted and classified. The 
technique for transforming available data to the BN identified and appropriate software has been 
chosen. Data have been analyzed and transfer to a primary BN. Then primary BN has been updated 
based on expert knowledge and historical data. RBI strategies have been selected, then inspection 
strategy applied by BN and conclusion have been made. 
3.2 Preliminary data collection  
In addition to relevant scientific literature and articles, this study used several documents, which 




Explosive atmospheres- part 17: Electrical installation 
inspection and maintenance
IEC 60079 - 17: 2013
ATEX Directive 
guideline
The directive for equipment for potentially explosive 
atmospheres defines the essential health and safety 
requirement and conformity assessment procedures to be 
applied before products are placed on the EU market.
ATEX Directive 
2014/34/EU
NORSOK Z-013 Risk and emergency preparedness analysis NORSOK Z-013: 2010
ISO 31010 Risk management - Risk assessment techniques IEC 31010: 2019
ISO 2859-1
Sampling procedures for inspection by attributes- part 1: 
sampling schemes indexed by acceptance quality limit 








Guidelines for managing inspection of Ex electrical 
equipment ignition risk in support of IEC 60079-17.
First edition, October 
2008
GeNIe Software for modeling a Bayesian Network.
Version 3.0.R2, Built 
on 11/5/2020
Inspectio The platform for registration the inspection data
Tabel 3.1: Relevant documents






The IEC 60079 series of international standards specifies the general requirements for designing 
Ex electrical equipment, and part 17 of this document includes information on its maintenance and 
inspection.  
According to IEC 60079-17:2013, Ex equipment should be maintained based on its functional 
requirements, and inspection ensures that equipment continues to comply with its original Ex 
certification requirements. This document divided inspection into four different types: initial 
inspection, periodic inspection, sample inspection, continuous supervision, and visual, close, and 
detailed can be different grads of inspection. 
ATEX Directive  
ATEX stands for ATmosphere EXplosive; this directive defines the workplace's essential health 
and safety requirements and equipment used in an explosive atmosphere. ATEX directive 
2014/34/EU, used in this thesis, replaced the previous ATEX Directive 94/9/EC, which was 
applicable between 1 July 2013 and 19 April 2016. The Guidelines are used in this thesis in 
conjunction with the directive itself (European, 2021). 
Two relevant ATEX documents for this thesis are ATEX 100a and ATEX 137. ATEX 100a 
includes “approximation of the Laws of Member States concerning Equipment and Protective 
Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres,” which is known as The ATEX 
'Equipment Directive'; And ATEX 137 presents “Directive on the Minimum Requirements for 
Improving the Health and Safety of Workers Potentially at Risk from Explosive Atmospheres” and 
is known as The ATEX 'Workplace Directive'. 
NORSOK Z-013 
NORSOK standards are developed by Standards Norway and supported by OLF (The Norwegian 
Oil Industry Association) in the line of adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness for 
petroleum industry developments and operations. NORSOK Z-013 has covers the emergency 
preparedness planning in the Norwegian offshore oil & gas industry.  





The aim of this standard is to describe how to plan for emergency response and establish 
requirements for consequence-reducing. NORSOK Z-013 presents requirements for effective 
planning and executive of risk and (or) emergency preparedness assessment in contribution with 
other international standards and industry guidelines to meet the NORSOK goals. 
ISO 31010 
Another relevant standard of The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) used in this 
study is IEC 31010:2019.   
International Standard IEC 31010 has been prepared by The International Organization for 
Standardization and The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). It presents guidance on 
selecting and applying techniques for assessing risk to help improve the way uncertainty.  
This document uses ISO 31000 risk assessment steps to identify, analyze, and evaluate risk, and it 
focuses on understanding uncertainty and its effects. The first edition was published in 2009. 
However, this study used the second edition, which cancels and replaces the first edition. 
ISO 2859-1 
ISO 2859-1 specifies sampling procedures for inspection by attributes where sampling is indexed 
by the acceptance quality limit (AQL). Although this standard has been developed for 
manufacturing applications, IEC 60079-17 guideline is provided suitable adaptations of it to the 
inspection of Ex electrical equipment. 
IP Research Report 
IP research report provides a guideline for the probability of ignition of flammable releases from 
onshore and offshore installations for quantitative risk analysis. This document reviewed current 
data in the petroleum industry (such as Cox et al., HSE OSD research, E&P forum, Ws Atkins, 
OIR12, etc.) and developed an ignition probability model for assigning ignition probabilities in 
quantitative risk analysis. In addition, it formed a superficial basis and guidance to assist 
practitioners in assigning ignition probabilities to generic scenarios. Energy Institute publishes this 
document. 






Guidelines for managing inspection of Ex electrical equipment ignition risk in support of IEC 
60079-17 are another document from the Energy Institute used in this study. This document 
presents the methodology for EX inspection based on the sampling plan. 
GeNIe academic version 3.0 
This software was developed by BayesFusion LLC in 2015 and acquired a license from the 
University of Pittsburgh. This company has three software as GeNIe and SMILE Engine for 
quantitative BN and QGeNIe for qualitative BN. One can download the free academic version of 
GeNIe 3.0 from the company website through the link https://www.bayesfusion.com.  
GeNIe has been written for the Windows operating systems, and the complete installation of the 
software requires less than 30 MB of disk space. Still, it is possible to use it on a Mac with Boot 
Camp. A helpful user manual for software is available on the company website. By GeNIe 3.0 
academic version could create Clemen Models, Discrete Bayesian Networks, Dynamic Bayesian 
Networks, Hybrid Bayesian Networks, and Influence Diagrams.  
This software consists of different useful tools that allow the user to expand a BN quickly and 
avoid calculate complex functions manually. It could be possible to reduce the number of variables 
that are not dependent on the BN by several tools like Noisy Max, Noisy Add, etc. Therefore, the 
result of the analysis could be based on the correct value for parameters. It could be possible to 
reduce the number of variables that are not dependent on the network by several tools like Noisy 
Max, Noisy Add, etc.  
For more information about the software and its functionality, please peruse the user manual.  
Inspectio Platform 
Modeling an effective EX RBI program requires specific data such as hazardous area classification, 
protection type, environmental conditions, equipment age, etc. Therefore, the recorded data are 
essential for EX maintenance and RBI strategy. These initial data, including historical information 
on installed Ex electrical equipment on the Rowan Viking rig, are provided by the Inspectio 





platform. IKM Elektor As has provided access to Inspectio platform for this study. Inspectio is a 
platform that is comfortable with web and mobile technologies as well. Figure 3.2 shows the 
Inspectio platform dashboard. 
  
Figure 3.2: Inspectio platform dashboard (Provided by Inspectio software) 
In this platform, companies can record their database for digital inspection in the hazardous area 
and offshore industry (inspection.no). EX equipment can be registered in Inspection based on 
their tag number and recorded all relevant documents and historical inspection reports. One can 
provide information about all equipment for the project in an excel sheet and individual reports 
for concerned equipment based on its tag number on a PDF file. 
Because of the enormous size of the excel sheet report, figure 3.3 shows only a part of the excel 
report. For instance, consider row 4488 the "EMERGENCY FLUORESCENT LIGHT." Column 
B shows ID and column C sequence of tag number. The date of creation can be found in column 
D and the Ex-zone in column AG. As figure 3.3 shows, one can summarize all relevant information 
by following columns of the excel sheet. 
When requires more consideration and detailed information of a particular piece of equipment, one 
can use tag numbers in the search bar and obtain recorded data. Annex A illustrates a sample of 
these types of reports. 







Figure 3.3: Emergency fluorescent light report (provided by Inspectio platform) 
 
3.3 The Bayesian Network Methodology for risk-based inspection 
 
Nowadays, inspection and maintenance have become a strategic concern in many industries to 
protect the public, financial investment, and the environment against the consequences of failures. 
Due to the increase in the variety of physical assets, more complex design, and changes in 





organizations' responsibilities, inspection and maintenance have considerably changed over the last 
few decades than other management disciplines. Because of the limitation on the maintenance 
resources, the available sources and funds should be spent more efficiently to reduce potential risks 
Abbasi et al. 2016).  
Inspection plays an essential role in detecting potential risks by detecting potential failures. These 
have led to the emergence of a new view to inspection and maintenance approach, known as risk-
based inspection (RBI). The main objective of RBI is to find an appropriate balance between the 
benefits of inspection and the cost of maintenance and inspection. Therefore, RBI strategies 
classify the level of risk of equipment or systems and then reduce the extra expense by reducing 
maintenance for equipment with lower risk (Abbassi et al. 2016). 
According to current inspection strategies, should inspect a nominal percentage of all EX-
equipment per annum. In some cases, it can be more than 50000 items, and in practice, it is not 
possible. Therefore, the cost of inspection increases, but the weight of the risk of ignition for critical 
equipment consider the same as others. However, such approaches do not best target inspection 
resources because different types of EX equipment present various risks based on their 
characteristics (EI, 2008). 
Mapping from Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to Bayesian Network. 
In 1988, Pearl propounded the Bayesian network, and it has received increasing attention in 
different fields in the past few years because of its strong uncertainty reasoning ability. A BN 
combines probability theory and graph theory and represents a graph with a set of probability tables 
(Bian, 2021). Babio et al. (2001) discussed how can transcend the limitations of FTA by relying 
on the Bayesian network. This section of the thesis used a simple example of failure probability to 
clarify the algorithm for transmission from FTA to BN.  
Figure 3.4: The example figure (Created by this study). 





Consider an electrical system consists of four components X1, X2, Y1, and Y2, such as figure 3.4. 
The system works when components X1 and X2 and either of the components Y1 or Y2 works. The 
aim is to calculate the probability of failure for the system. Figure 3.5 shows FT for the example. 
Figure 3.5: FT for example (created by this study) 
In the example, FTA defines the probability of failure for the system by: 
P[A ∩ B ∩ (C ∪ D)] = (0.1)(0.1)[1-(0.2)(0.2)]=0.0036 
Converting from FTA to BN consist of two tasks, probability transformation and graphic 
transformation. Figure 3.6 illustrated the mapping algorithm for converting.  
The primary event, intermediate event, and top event of FT convert to the root node, intermediate 
node, and child node for BN. Consider X1 in figure 3.5 X1 represents the status of a binary 
component. Therefore, it could be assigned values X1 = 0 if the component is working and X1 = 1 
if there is a failure. On the other hand, X1 will be inspected at time t, and the probability distribution 
of X1 = 1 = faulty could be considered the prior probability for each basic node. 






Figure 3.6 algorithm for converting from FT to BN (Bobbio, 2001). 
Transforming logic gates (OR and AND) from FT by CPT into BN could be the main challenge of 
modeling. Consider Figures 3.5, basic events Y1 and Y2 are parents’ nodes for BN, and output 
events X3 is the child node (the same logical relationships are between X1, X2 and X3 with TE).  
The purpose is to use the logic relation between parents’ nodes and assign conditional probability 
tables for children’s nodes. The logic gates represent deterministic causal relationships, where 
Fault=1 and working=0; consequently, all the entries of the corresponding CPT are either 0s or 1s.  
Table 3.2 shows entries CPT assigned to nodes X3 and TE. 





Table 3.2: Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for the example 
X3 = Y1 OR Y2 TE = X1 AND X2 AND X3 
P(X3=1 ∣ Y1=0, Y2=0) = 0 P(TE=1 ∣ X1=0, X2=0, X3=0) = 0 
P(X3=1 ∣ Y1=1, Y2=0) = 1 P(TE=1 ∣ X1=0, X2=0, X3=1) = 0 
P(X3=1 ∣ Y1=0, Y2=1) = 1 P(TE=1 ∣ X1=0, X2=1, X3=1) = 0 
P(X3=1 ∣ Y1=1, Y2=1) = 1 P(TE=1 ∣ X1=0, X2=1, X3=0) = 0 
  P(TE=1 ∣ X1=1, X2=0, X3=0) = 0 
  P(TE=1 ∣ X1=1, X2=1, X3=0) = 0 
  P(TE=1 ∣ X1=1, X2=0, X3=1) = 0 
  P(TE=1 ∣ X1=1, X2=1, X3=1) = 1 
0 = The System Work        1 = The System Failure 
In many cases, FTA presents implicit gates like figure 3.7. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Implicit AND gate (Bobbio, 2001). 
Practically an FTA solver uses Boolean functions to tackle the problem. Therefore, BN should 
modify the corresponding CPT based on Boolean functions as follow (Bobbio, 2001): 





P (TE=1 ∣ X1 = 0, X2 = 0, X3 = 0) = 0 
P (TE=1 ∣ X1 = 1, X2 = 0, X3 = 0) = 0 
P (TE=1 ∣ X1 = 0, X2 = 1, X3 = 0) = 0 
P (TE=1 ∣ X1 = 0, X2 = 0, X3 = 1) = 0 
P (TE=1 ∣ X1 = 1, X2 = 1, X3 = 0) = 1 
P (TE=1 ∣ X1 = 0, X2 = 1, X3 = 1) = 1 
P (TE=1 ∣ X1 = 1, X2 = 0, X3 = 1) = 1 
P (TE=1 ∣ X1 = 1, X2 = 1, X3 = 1) = 1 
In a BN, n variables can present 2n combinations. As is shown in table 3.2, node X3 with two-
parent nodes has 22=4 parameters, and node TE with three parents has 23=8 parameters. Since the 
number of parameters is exponential in the number of parents, and the number of parameters could 
grow exponentially. Please consider a node with 15 parents; then, the number of parameters could 
be 32768 and increase to 1048576 parameters by adding only five new parents. 
On the other hand, a BN represents probability distributions of each variable conditional on other 
variables. Every joint probability distribution over n random variables can be factorized in n! ways. 
Consider a simple BN with four-node A, B, D, and C then the joint probability distribution over 
these four variables can be factorized in 4! =24 ways as follow: 
P (A, B, C, D) = P (A ∣ B, C, D) P (B ∣ C, D) P (C ∣ D) P (D) 
P (A, B, C, D) = P (A ∣ B, C, D) P (B ∣ C, D) P (D ∣ C) P (C) 
P (A, B, C, D) = P (A ∣ B, C, D) P (C ∣ B, D) P (B ∣ D) P (D) 
P (A, B, C, D) = P (A ∣ B, C, D) P (C ∣ B, D) P (D ∣ B) P (B) 






P (A, B, C, D) = P (D ∣ A, B, C) P (A ∣ B, C) P (B ∣ C) P (C) 
As a result, an expanded BN by belief updating is computationally complex. The other source that 
the complexity of probabilistic models could stem from is the connectivity of the directed graphs 
modeling the problem structure (Cooper, 1990). Anyway, several efficient software (MSBN, 
GeNIe, HUGIN, etc.) make the expansion of a BN easier and reduce the risk of a mistake on 
computationally complex. As mentioned, this study uses GeNIe 3.0 academic version. 
 
Figure 3.8: The GeNIe graph view window (Created by GeNIe academic version 3.0). 
Figure 3.8 shows the model for example graphically. By double-clicking on the node Y1, the node 
properties window could be opened; then, it is possible to assign the prior distribution values for 
each state in the definition part as follow:  
State 0 = Working = 0.8 
State 1 = Fault = 0.2 
The same task is required for nodes X1, X2, X3, and Y2. The CPT table for node X3 should be 
written as follow: 





Table 3.3: The CPT table for X3 
States for parent nodes     States for Child Node 
        Node X3 
Y1   Y2   Working   Fault 
Working   Working   1   0 
Working   Fault   0   1 
Fault   Working   0   1 
Fault   Fault   0   1 
  
 
By assigning the CPT to the child nodes X3 and TE, the result of BN and the values for critical 
parameters are shown in figure 3.9. The result is equal to FTA, and the probability of failure for 
the system is 0.0036. 
 
Figure 3.9: The result of BN (created by GeNIe academic version 3.0) 
Working Fault Working Fault
   Working 1 0 0 0
   Fault 0 1 1 1
   Working 0.64
   Fault 0.36
Working Fault Working Fault Working Fault Working Fault
   Working 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
   Fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
   Working 0.9964
   Fault 0.0036
Marginal probability distribution TE
CPT X3
X2 Working Fault Working Fault
X3
Y2









Mapping from Event Tree Analysis (ETA) to Bayesian Network. 
Figure 3.10 shows the algorithm for transmission from ETA to BN (Bearfield & Marsh, 2005). 
 
Figure 3.10: Algorithm from ETA to BN (Bearfield & Marsh, 2005). 
Consider the previous example; the analysis aims to quantify the consequences of failure where 
there is a potential for ignition. The top event on PoF analysis could be considered as the initial 
event on CoF analysis. The initial event may create undesirable events, such as immediate ignition 
and delayed ignition, respectively. The final consequences could be fire, explosion, and no 




Figure 3.11: Example for ET (Created by this study). 





Figure 3.12 shows the graphic view window on GeNIe after updating new information. This 
software provides two possibilities for a graphic view window. The result can be shown in icon 
shape like figure 3.8 or by bar chart like figure 3.12. 
 
Figure 3.12: The GeNIe graph view window for resultof example (Created by GeNIe academic version 3.0). 
The concept of the consequence node is the same as the concept of the logic gates on FTA and 
express a deterministic causal relationship.  
As mentioned earlier, generally, in risk-based approaches, the risk is a product of the probability 
of failure and consequence of failure. Therefore, these two parameters are the main blocks of risk-
based analysis. Still, the relationship between these two is unclear in most calculations (Bai et al. 
2015). Consider node C in the example as the target node; by selecting sensitivity analysis from 
the network toolbar, the algorithm calculates a complete set of derivatives of the posterior 





probability distributions over the target nodes over each of the numerical parameters of the 
Bayesian network efficiently. When the product is significant for a parameter p, then a slight 
change in p may lead to a considerable shift in the posteriors of the targets. Highly sensitive 
parameters affect the reasoning results more significantly. 
On the one hand, this feature provides an opportunity for analyzers to identify critical parameters 
and deal with them, and on the other hand, identifies critical events of models. Figure 3.13 
illustrates the sensitivity analysis of the model and informs nodes E1 and TE are vital to the model. 
In the word, PoF and E1 have more effect on CoF than others. 
 
Figure 3.13: Sensitivity analysis (Created by GeNIe academic version 3.0). 
 





4.4. Risk Matrix 
POF and CoF results will be introduced in five-level, and then a 5x5 risk matrix will develop based 
on API-580 guideline recommendation. Figure 3.14 illustrates the risk matrix. 
 
Figure 3.14: Risk matrix (Created by this study) 
This study uses the qualitative risk matrix. BN analysis could be transferred to the risk matrix and 
present the risk of ignition in three-level low, medium, and high.  
The vertical axis assigned to the value of POF and could be frequent, probable, occasional, 
unlikely, and extremely unlikely based on the result of the analysis. The horizontal axis identifies 
the level of COF. It could be very low, low, medium, high, and very high. 
4.5 Reliability and Validity 
According to Aven (2020), “the concept of reliability is concerned with the consistency of the 
‘measuring instrument’ (analysts, methods, procedures), whereas validity is concerned with the 
success at ‘measuring’ what one set out to ‘measure’ in the analysis.” Figure 3.15 shows traditional 
illustrations of the concepts of reliability and validity. 
 
Figure 3.15: Traditional illustrations of the concepts of reliability and validity (Aven, 2020). 
Frequent >0.01 5 M5 H10 H15 H20 H25
Probable 0.01-.0.001 4 L4 M8 M12 H16 H20
Occasional 0.001-0.0001 3 L3 M6 M9 M12 H15
Unlikely 0.0001-0.00001 2 L2 L4 L6 M8 H10
Extremely unlikely <0.00001 1 L1 L2 L3 L4 M5
1 2 3 4 5
<0.00001 0.0001-0.00001 0.001-0.0001 0.01-.0.001 >0.01









The circle center presents the actual value and will be achieved when the analysis has repeated 
quantity measurements. The result of research could be achieved reliability when the 
measurements are close to each other and could achieve validity when measurements are close to 
the center. 
Consider P as the frequentist probability that a chosen component in a considerable population of 
ex equipment has a specific failure. By repeated sampling, reliability and validity could be 
obtained. The reputation of the same failure in many observations shows consistency (reliability) 
and accuracy (validity) relative to the actual P. 
This perspective on reliability and validity is based on the traditional statistic theory. Still, it is so 
difficult to obtain these two concepts based on the conventional view in the real world. Consider 
the situation where two different teamwork in the same area to evaluate the risk of equipment. As 
mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the probability of failure these two groups provide is 
conditional based on their knowledge background. Consequently, they could present different P, 
and when their background of knowledge is so far from each other, this value of P could 
significantly differ. 
In reality, when an analysis model provides more place for dealing with uncertainty, it has more 
chance to obtain validity and reliability. One of the advantages of the Bayesian network is this 
characteristic, where it is possible to repeat sampling and provide the traditional concept of validity 
and reliability. On the other hand, it could be updated based on the expert's judgment and provide 
good dealing with uncertainty. 
 





Chapter 4. Empirical Data Analysis 
This chapter presents and analyzes data from The Rowan Viking Rig according to standards, 
regulations, and theoretical understanding to provide appropriate answers for research question 1: 
" How to apply a Bayesian Network to estimate the PoF and CoF regarding the EX risk-based 
inspection (EXRBI)?"  
The start point for data analysis is based on the ISO-31000 risk assessment principle. So, this 
chapter contains five steps as follow: 
Figure 4.1: Steps for data analysis (Provided by this study) 
 
4.1. Analysis data to identify fault mechanisms for EX equipment. 
Working with electrical equipment is generally risky and, when they are used in hazardous areas, 
requires a fully alert about designing, installing, and maintaining these systems (Bottrill et al. 
2005). IEC 60079 series provides general requirements Ex equipment (construction, testing, 
inspection, and marking) for explosive atmospheres. The main concern of IEC standards is about 
the risk of ignition, which can be created by EX equipment. IEC 60079-17 defines ignition risk for 
EX equipment as: 
(Probability of flammable atmosphere being present) x (Probability of source of the ignition being 
present) 
Therefore, first needs to identify where there is the possibility of a conducive atmosphere for 
ignition. The area classification could be considered a tool to ensure overall platform safety and 
minimize the risk of loss to life and assets (Bottrill et al. 2005). The concept of hazardous areas in 
this thesis refers to areas with a risk of explosion because possible flammable atmospheres exist, 
such as drilling rigs (offshore or onshore), petrochemical plants, or refineries. Therefore, it is 





necessary to ensure the electrical equipment installed in a hazardous area could not form a spark 
or hot surface and igniting the flammable atmosphere. According to IEC 79, flammable material is 
"a gas, vapor, liquid, or solid that can react continuously with atmospheric oxygen and may 
therefore sustain fire or explosion when such reaction is initiated by a suitable spark, flame, or hot 
surface." Since the case study of the thesis is an offshore rig, the hazardous materials of concern 
for this study are gas and oil.  
Forasmuch as each installation will differ in some respects, finding a consistent method or standard 
for area classification will not be easy. Therefore, different industries use their accepted industry 
standard ways. Area classification in the offshore industry is based on three situations for hazardous 
areas (EI, 2008): 
• Zone 2 (low risk): secondary grade release, where an explosive atmosphere rarely occurs 
in normal operation or only for a short period. e.g., > 1 000 hours per annum 
• Zone 1 (medium risk): primary grade release, where an explosive atmosphere frequently 
occurs. e.g., 10-1 000 hours per annum. 
• Zone 0 (high risk): continuous grade release, where an explosive atmosphere is 
continuously present or present for long periods (continuous). e.g., 1-10 hours per annum 
According to IEC 60079-17 non-hazardous area is an “Area in which an explosive atmosphere is 
not expected to be present in quantities such as to require special precautions for the construction, 
installation, and use of equipment.” As it is evident, identification source of release and the grade 
of release are two essential elements to establishing the hazardous zone types are the identification 
of the. 
The second factor of ignition risk is the source of ignition. The source of ignition in this study is 
electrical equipment installed in an offshore flammable atmosphere. When electrical equipment 
installing in hazardous areas, the designers should have adequate knowledge of the sources of heat 
generation. Electrical energy could be converted to heat energy by resistance heating, dielectric 
heating, induction heating, leakage current heating, heat from arcing, static electricity heating, and 
heat generated by lighting. Therefore, the ignition sources could ignite electrical equipment in 
hazardous areas through hot surfaces, electrical arcs and sparks, and electrical discharge (Bottrill 
et al. 2005). 





Generally, electrical equipment for an explosive atmosphere is divided into two categories. The 
group Ⅰ includes electrical equipment for underground industries, and they are not the subject of 
this study. Group Ⅱ contains electrical equipment for surface industries divided into three 
subgroups. Two important factors in this subdivision are MESG value and MIC ratio. MESG stands 
for maximum experiment safe gap, and MIC ratio refers to minimum igniting current ratio. Based 
on these two elements, different subgroups are as follow (Bottrill et al. 2005): 
• ⅡA: MESG > 0.90 mm, and MIC > 0.80  
• ⅡB: 0.90 mm ≥ MESG > 0.50 mm, and 0.80 ≥ MIC > 0.45 
• ⅡC: 0.50 mm ≥ MESG, and 0.45 ≥ MIC. 
Today, there are different approaches to make the equipment safe for use in hazardous areas. They 
are known as EX protection and are introduced by a code which depicting the type of protection. 
Some of these different types of protection based on IEC60079-17 are: 
• flameproof ('d'); 
• increased safety ('e') and  
• non incendive ('n'); 
• intrinsic safety (i,'ia', 'ib'); 
• pressurized apparatus ('p'), and 
• other type of protection (oil-filled ('o'), powder-filled ('q'), encapsulated("m") 
Data from the Inspectio platform present The Rowan Viking Rig electrical equipment according to 
different factors, as shown in figure 4.2. Some of these factors are already have been introduced. 
All equipment has been coded base on the IP rating. The Ingress Protection (IP) Codes define by 
two numbers, such as IP 66. The first number indicates the degree of protection against solids and 
could be between 0= no protection and increase until 6 = complete protection against contact and 
ingress of dust. The second numeral specified the degree of protection against harmful effects due 
to the ingress of liquid or water. It could be between 0 = no protection until 8 = Protection against 
indefinite immersion in water (Bottrill et al. 2005).  






Figure 4.2: Columns AN, AO, AP, AQ, AR, AS, AT, and AU of report excel sheet from Inspectio platform 
(provided by Inspectio software). 
Moreover, equipment is classified based on the maximum surface temperature. The temperature 
class for equipment must be lower than the ignition temperature, which could be present by the 
release source. These codes could vary in different standards, so table 4.1 illustrates this difference 
worldwide (Bottrill et al. 2005). 
Table 4.1: different temperature classification codes 
IEC/CENELEC Australia Japan (RIIS-TR-79-1) USA (NEC 1984) 
Class 
Maximum Surface 
Temp. (° C) 
Class 
Maximum Surface 
Temp. (° C) 
Class 
Maximum Surface 
Temp. (° C) 
T1 450 G1 360 T1 450 









T4 135 G4 110 T4 135 
T4A 120 
T5 100 G5 80 T5 100 
T6 85 G6 70 T6 85 
Source: Bottrill et al. 2005 
 
Based on historical information from the Inspectio platform, In the Rowan Viking rig, there is 5181 
active EX equipment.  Table 4.2 shows information about EX equipment according to this rig. 
Manufacturer ID-NODrawing NoPosition No:ComplianceEPL Ex Protection ClassGas Group Temperature Class IP Rating
AP14685-EXE-0018.00133 Ex 2G edm IIC T5 67
AP14685-EXE-0018.00112 Ex 2GD e II T4-T6 66
AP14685-EXE-0018.00110 Ex 2 de IIC T6 66
AP14685-EXE-0018.00140 Ex 2G edm IIC T5 67
AP14685-EXE-0018.00142 Ex 2G edm IIC T5 67





Table 4.2: information about EX equipment on The Rowan Vi-
king Rig. 
  Fault equipment Working equipment Total 
Zone Safe 629 2540 3169 
Zone 2 481 1043 1524 
Zone 1 173 308 481 
Zone 0 4 3 7 
Total 1287 3894 5181 
Source: Inspectio software. 
As shown in table 4.2, there is 1287 fault equipment in this rig. There is a difference between fault 
equipment and failure code. For example, consider the fluorescent light with tag number 8266.15-
E14, which is installed in the safe area. Figure 4.3 illustrates the inspection data for this tag. 
 
Figure 4.3: PDF report for tag number 8266.15-E14 (presented by Inspectio platform) 
There are two faults for this tag; code Z is about EX integrity, and code T1A8 is about safety and 
increases the risk according to this tag. This study divided the failure codes into three categories: 





• Priority 1 includes faults that require quick action, and corrective action should be taken 
during a week; these faults are more influence the safety and increasing the risk of 
equipment (For example, loose terminations or damage on cable). 
• Priority 2 includes faults where corrective action could take in the medium term. They are 
more related to EX integrity (For example equipment group is not correct). 
• Priority 3 includes some faults that are non-compliance with standards, and corrective 
action could take longer because they do not affect risk (for example, unreadable labels). 
4.2 Development of a Bayesian network for EX equipment 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the main risk according to EX equipment is their potential 
for ignition, which is influenced by two factors, flammable atmosphere, and source of ignition.  
IEC-60079, ATEX directive, or other relevant standards and guidelines use qualitative approaches 
to identify the explosive atmosphere based on the different zones mentioned in section 4.1. The 
Rowan Viking Rig data are based on these qualitative approaches where equipment is placed in 
four zones: safe zone, zone 2, zone 1, and zone0. These qualitative approaches are not appropriate 
for a BN because it requires assigning a value for this parameter, indicating the probability of a 
flammable atmosphere. Still, data and practical models are not available to give suitable values for 
this parameter in QRA. One of the most reliable references in this regard is the IP research report. 
Therefore, this study assigned value for the release source based on the IP research report, as shown 
in Table 4.3. 
 
In modern offshore platforms, zone classification is based on other factors such as proper process 
equipment, special ventilation arrangements, etc. Still, in abnormal operations, an explosive 
atmosphere may be present in designated non-hazardous areas; For instance, offshore 
4.3:Ignition probability for source of release
Source: (IP research report,  2006).





accommodations have emergency lighting that would be expected to operate in abnormal 
operations. The term ‘abnormal’ is not intended to mean ‘unperfect.’ It does mean ‘unactual’ or 
‘unreal’ applied to the conditions, as they exist in any given offshore platform (Geoffrey 
Bottrill,2005). The EI guideline (2008) suggests considering non-hazardous areas as Zone 2 areas 
to inspect Ex electrical equipment in offshore installations. Therefore, this study considers zone 
safe as zone2 where the release rate category follows minor (<1kg/s) in abnormal operation, Zone2 
as zone1 where the release rate category follows major (1-50 kg/s) in abnormal operation, and 
zone0 & zone 1 as zone0 where the release rate category follows massive (>50 kg/s) in abnormal 
operation. 
The sources of ignition for this study are EX equipment installed on the Rowan Viking Rig. Figures 
4.4 and 4.5 shows the failure scenarios of this thesis. 
 
Figure 4.4: Fault tree model for the Rowan Viking rig concerning the probability of ignition (created by this study). 






Figure 4.5: Event tree model for the Rowan Viking rig concerning the probability of ignition (created by this study). 
The EX-equipment has been divided into three categories according to their operational 
atmosphere. The possible failure for each zona is based on data analysis from The Rowan Viking 
Rig (Table 4.2 and 4.4). This study considers consequences according to two intermediate events, 
immediate ignition and delayed ignition, and the final consequences could be fire, explosion, or no 
consequences. 
Table 4.4: Data based on failure priority. 
  Zone 2 Zone 1 Zone0 Total  
P1 147 59 35 241  
P2 26 7 2 35  
P3 456 415 140 1011  
Total 629 481 177 1287  
Source: Inspectio report 
 
 





Table 4.5 introduces root nodes and components of BN and their probabilities. 




OZ0 0.08 Probability of oil release in Zone 0 
GZ0 0.3 Probability of gas release in Zone 0 
P1Z0 0.0272 Probability of failure equipment with priority 1 in Zone 0 
P2Z0 0.001554 Probability of failure equipment with priority 2 in Zone 0 
P3Z0 0.1088 Probability of failure equipment with priority 3 in Zone 1 
OZ1 0.03 Probability of oil release in Zone 1 
GZ1 0.07 Probability of gas release in Zone 1 
P1Z1 0.04584 Probability of failure equipment with priority 1 in Zone 1 
P2Z1 0.005439 Probability of failure equipment with priority 2 in Zone 1 
P3Z1 0.3225 Probability of failure equipment with priority 3 in Zone 2 
OZ2 0.01 Probability of oil release in Zone 2 
GZ2 0.01 Probability of gas release in Zone 2 
P1Z2 0.1142 Probability of failure equipment with priority 1 in Zone 2 
P2Z2 0.0202 Probability of failure equipment with priority 2 in Zone 2 
P3Z2 0.3543 Probability of failure equipment with priority 3 in Zone 3 
PFZ0 Logic OR gate Probability of failure equipment in Zone 0 
SRZ0 Logic OR gate Probability of source of release Zone 0 
PFZ1 Logic OR gate Probability of failure equipment in Zone 1 
SRZ1 Logic OR gate Probability of source of release Zone 1 
PFZ2 Logic OR gate Probability of failure equipment in Zone 2 
SRZ2 Logic OR gate Probability of source of release Zone 2 
PZ0 Logic AND gate Probability of ignition Zone 0 
PZ1 Logic AND gate Probability of ignition Zone 1 
PZ2 Logic AND gate Probability of ignition Zone 2 
PE Logic OR gate Probability of ignition  
E1 0.4 Immediate ignition  
E2 0.5 Delayed ignition 
C  Logic gate Consequence node 
 
By converting fault tree and event tree on GeNIe software and assigning values for parameters, the 
primary model for this thesis is shown in figure 4.6.  






Figure 4.6: Primary model for this thesis 
Two states are identified for basic nodes: the Present, which indicates the probability value, and 
the Absence indicates 1-P. CPT for logic gates are as follow: 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the definition for event nodes. 
 
Figure 4.7: CPT for consequences nodes 
SRZ0 = OZ0 OR GZ0 PFZ0= P1Z0 OR P2Z0 OR P3Z0 PZ0 = SRZ0 OR PFZ0
P(SRZ0=1 ∣ OZ0=0, GZ0=0) = 0 P(FZ0=1 ∣ X1=0, X2=0, X3=0) = 0 P(PZ0=1 ∣ SRZ0=0, PFZ0=0) = 0
P(SRZ0=1 ∣ OZ0=1, GZ0=0) = 1 P(FZ0=1 ∣ X1=0, X2=0, X3=1) = 1 P(PZ0=1 ∣ SRZ0=0, PFZ0=1) = 0
P(SRZ0=1 ∣ OZ0=0, GZ0=1) = 1 P(FZ0=1 ∣ X1=0, X2=1, X3=1) = 1 P(PZ0=1 ∣ SRZ0=1, PFZ0=0) = 0
P(SRZ0=1 ∣ OZ0=1, GZ0=1) = 1 P(FZ0=1 ∣ X1=0, X2=1, X3=0) = 1 P(PZ0=1 ∣ SRZ0=1, PFZ0=1) = 1
P(FZ0=1 ∣ X1=1, X2=0, X3=0) = 1
P(FZ0=1 ∣ X1=1, X2=1, X3=0) = 1
P(FZ0=1 ∣ X1=1, X2=0, X3=1) = 1
P(FZ0=1 ∣ X1=1, X2=1, X3=1) = 1
Table 4.5: CPT for parents nodes




Present Absent Present Absent
YES 0 0 0.5 0
NO 1 1 0.5 1
YES NO YES NO
Fire 1 1 0 0
Exp 0 0 1 0
















Data on the timing of ignition and consequences are not available on the data set of the Rowan 
Viking Rig because there were no such events for this rig. Therefore, in this study is used the IP 
research report for ignition timing and fire explosion probabilities. 
The result of the primary model shows in figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7: The result of primary model analysis. (GeINe academic version 3.0) 
The primary model results provide general knowledge about all EX equipment installed in The 
Rowan Viking Rig. Still, they are not sufficient for presentation on the risk matrix. Therefore, they 
need to be updated based on historical information and experts' judgment to provide appropriate 
values for the risk matrix. The next chapter will discuss how this model could be updated and apply 
in the risk-based inspection. 
  Fire 0.035666106
  EXP 0.026749579
  NonCon 0.93758432
  Present 0.03200002
  Absent 0.96799998
Marginal probability distribution Node C
Marginal probability distribution Node PE





Chapter 5. Discussion 
The previous chapter presents a Bayesian network for Ex electrical equipment, which indicates the 
probability of ignition because of failure and consequences.  This chapter aims to update the 
primary model and present a risk-based strategy based on the BN result. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
strategy that is suggested by this thesis. 
 
Figure 5.1: Risk-based inspection Strategy for EX electrical equipment (presented by this study). 
5.1 Updating the BN 
One of the advantages of BN is the possibility of updating the model based on evidence and 
providing a cause-effect analysis. Figure 5.2 illustrates two different results for the consequences 
node. The first figure shows consequences in general situations where the aim is to provide 
knowledge about all EX equipment installed in The Rowan Viking Rig. Consider the case where 
inspection identifies a failure in Zone 1; the objective is to understand the effect of this failure on 
the consequences and its associated risk. Therefore, the probability distributions on the BN need 
to update in light of the empirical evidence. Data will be updated based on this new information by 





selecting state present as evidence on node PFZ1. The second figure shows the posterior probability 
distribution after updating the network. 
 
Figure 5.2: Result based on primary model and updating (GeINe academic version 3.0) 
In the first case, the probability of ignition is 0.034%, and the likelihood of undesirable 
consequences is a total of 0.064%. By updating BN based on failure on Z1, the probability of 
ignition and CoF have increased respectively to 0.1485% and 0.104%. The sensitivity analysis 
shows (figure 5.3) the probability node and consequence node are influenced by the parent's nodes. 
That means changes in these nodes have more effect on the result of the model. 
 
Figure 5.3: The sensitivity analysis result (GeNIe academic version 3.0) 





The quantitative analysis of a Bayesian Network has two aspects, predictive and diagnostic. On the 
one hand, the probability of occurrence of any node could be calculated based on the prior 
probabilities of the root nodes and the conditional dependence of each node, which provide a 
predictive view for analysis. On the other hand, modeling of some of the variables to one of their 
permissible values by the evidence provides the computation of the posterior probability of any 
given set of variables, which gives molding a diagnostic view. These two features allow the analyst 
to consider uncertainty on analysis and update the model with new data. For instance, the risk 
scenario in this thesis is divided faults equipment into three categories based on their priority; the 
primary assumption on the model for the logic gates was based on Boolean functions from FT. 
These functions have deterministic relations with values 0 or 1. Therefore, nodes PFZ1,2 and 3 
explain that the failure will occur when P1, P2, and P3 exist. This status expresses with certainty, 
and the model presents the same weight to all of them. But in reality, when P3 exists, the equipment 
works without functionality fault. The BN allows analyses to modify the uncertain relations of the 
logic gates based on expert judgment or historical analysis data.  
This study updated the primary model in two areas. First, nodes PZ0,1, and 2 could be updated 
based on information about the probability of ignition from the IP research report. The second 
could be provided weighting for P1, P2, and P3 based on recommendations from IEC 60079-17 
guidelines. Figure 5.4 illustrates the definition of modifying nodes PFZ1, PFZ2, and PFZ3. 
 
Figure 5.4: Definition of modifying nodes PFZ1, PFZ2, and PFZ3 (GeNIe academic version 3.0). 
Updating the model based on the information could evaluate the risk of failure according to ex 
electrical equipment in the inspection. But before definition about how could use it in practice, it 
is required to identify the inspection strategy and acceptance criteria. An appropriate EX equipment 
risk-based inspection strategy needs to ensure the integrity of Ex equipment throughout its life 
cycle phases, where the inspection approach should cover the objectives of the organization with 
Present Absent Present Absent Present Absent Present Absent
Pressent 1 1 1 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.25 0











the criteria and principles as well as legislation, regulations and standards at the same time. 
Therefore, a risk-based inspection strategy requires to identify appropriate acceptance criteria to 
support management system to ensure the safe operation, maintenance, and work on Ex electrical 
equipment (EI, 2008). However, IEC 60079-17 provide flexibility for the size of equipment and 
grade of inspection, where the frequency of inspection can reduce by good performance. Therefore, 
this study uses sampling strategy and adjust IEC 60079-17 guideline to introduce suitable risk-
based inspection methodology and provide balance between the cost of inspection and confidence 
in the Ex-integrity of the equipment by ALARP principle. The main goal of using ALARP principle 
as acceptance criteria and sampling strategy is reducing the cost of inspection by reduction on 
inspected equipment where the objectives of risk-based inspection should be meet. The next section 
defines the concept of acceptance criteria. 
5.2 Acceptance Criteria 
The sampling plan basically follows the ISO-2859-1 acceptance sampling system and then adopts 
the IEC 60079-17 and ALARP principles. Therefore, several parameters play an essential role for 
acceptance criteria as ALARP acceptance safety level (ALARP-ASL), rejection number (R), 10 
%probability of acceptance Pa(10%), and 5% probability of rejection Pr(5%).  
Generally, the hypergeometric distribution and the binomial distribution are used for the 
acceptance sampling. When the sample size (n) is small compared to the lot (N), changes in the N 
items are not significant, but the calculation of N! will be so complicated. Therefore, it is helpful 
to use the binomial distribution when n/N<0.15 (EI, 2008): 





As mentioned earlier, R is the rejection number; therefore, a sample with R-1 faulty equipment will 
be acceptable. For example, if R=10, then the sample could be accepted until nine faulty equipment. 
So, the probability of acceptance sampling with R-1 faulty equipment can be cumulative 
distribution when x=R-1 (EI, 2008): 
 
According to ISO-2859-1, AQL is the acceptable quality level. This study uses the concept of ASL, 
which is defined as an acceptable safety level by the IEC 60079-17 guideline. Same as AQL, the 
concept of ASL indicate the worst tolerable process average and an unacceptable number of faulty 
equipment in the sampling. The IEC guideline has already calculated some standard value for ASL 
as 0,25%; 0,4%; 0,65%; 1%, 1,5%; 2,5%; 4% and 6,5%. Still, it is possible to calculate other values 
by using the formulas which are mentioned above (EI, 2008). 
EX risk-based inspection requires a reasonable balance between the cost of inspection and the 
quality of the lot. IEC 60079-17 guideline uses two parameters pa(10%) and pr(5%) as 
discrimination ratio (pa/pr) to adjust ASL with ALARP principle in EX equipment risk-based 
inspection. Using the sampling for inspection, sometimes the safety level of the lot would not be 
acceptable when the safety level of the sample is acceptable. Pa(10%) indicates 10 percent 
confidence of sampling plan according to the lot and calculates as P(X=R)=0.1. It means the 
probability to accept a lot of N equipment containing R faulty equipment is one in 10 times with 
the sampling plan of n equipment. In other words, it means one in ten times the safety level of the 
sample is acceptable when the safety level of the lot is not acceptable. This value considers the 
quality of the sampling plan (EI, 2008). 
On the other hand, an inspection plan should consider the cost of inspection as well. The parameter 
pr(5%) indicates the criteria for inspection cost. In the inverse with the previous situation, there is 
a possibility for the rejection of the safety level for the sampling plan when the safety level of the 
lot size is acceptable. This situation will charge the cost of new sampling and inspection. Pr(5%) 
defines the safety level of the lot as not acceptable with a 5% probability and calculates it as P(X=R-





1)=0.05. That means one in twenty times is possible to reject sampling when the quality of safety 
level is acceptable (EI, 2008). 
Selecting lower ASL than the ALARP ASL disproportionately increases the inspection cost; On 
the other hand, selection of a higher ASL than the ALARP ASL reduces inspection quality. Annex 
B identifies cliff-edge effects based on pa(10%)/pr(5%) versus ASL for different lot sizes to 
determine ALARP ASL (EI, 2008).  
Annex B contains sampling tables for various ASLs and the determination of ALARP-ASLs for 
different lot sizes which are provided by EI guideline, and this study use them as acceptance 
criteria. These tables included seven columns as 
• Lot size 
• Global failure rate level 
• Normal inspection 
• Reduced inspection 
• Increased inspection 
• Pa(10%) for normal inspection (%) 
• Pr(5%) for normal inspection (%) 
The concept of global failure level refers to the observed failure rate based on the type of protection. 
According to the EI guideline: “The commonly assumed failure rate of a lot is the mean failure 
rate of a similar lot in a similar location. In the absence of any specific information, a default value 
of level II should be assumed.” 
Also, these tables are based on three categories of inspection reduce, normal and increased. The 
first sampling plan should be based on the normal category.  These categories should not be 
confused with the inspection grade visual, close, and detailed (EI, 2008). 
5.3 Define lots. 
Ex electrical equipment can be different based on protection type, hazardous area, age, and 
environmental conditions. Therefore, lots of equipment should be divided them into the similar 
group based on these factors (EI, 2008).  





There are different ways to assigning equipment to specific lots. It will be more practical if a lot 
comprises mixed equipment like motors, junction boxes, etc. It can give the advantage to introduce 
a large number of EX equipment in different lots to taking sampling based on acceptance criteria. 
When the lot size is too small, it is likely only one faulty equipment reject sampling because of the 
small value of the rejection criteria. The rejection criterion is determined by R in the acceptance 
criteria. The sample is accepted when the number of faulty equipment is less than R. Another 
advantage can be in the inspection process; when a lot includes different types of equipment, an 
inspection can cover various types of equipment in shutdown time (EI, 2008). 
Deterioration processes and faults such as corrosion, vibration, and inadequate equipment selection 
will always be present to some degree. They may reduce the system's performance beyond what is 
acceptable. Therefore, an EXRBI methodology should identify the failure mechanism for EX 
equipment to improve the continuing management of ignition risk by assuring the continuing 
integrity of Ex electrical equipment. A risk-based inspection gives more weight to high-risk 
equipment applied in the BN model to identify equipment criticality. So, the inspection priority is 
to start inspecting high-risk equipment located in a high-risk area (EI, 2008). 
 
5.4 Applying the BN model in the inspection 
 
This section presents how to apply the BN for inspection using two exampless from the Rowan 
Viking Rig. As mentioned before, the equipment in a lot should be homogeneous in one or more 
characteristics.  
The first Lot includes 839 pieces of equipment from gas group II installed in a safe zone based on 
historical data from the Inspectio platform. According to table C.12 in annex B, the 
ALARP/ASL=1% and sample size will be 80 with three rejection numbers (table C.7 annex B). 
There are two types of sampling progressive and random. This study used random sampling.  
The result shows five faulty equipment in this sampling. The inspection reports are available in 
annex A.  
To evaluate the risk of ignition for this faulty equipment, the nodes P1Z2, P2Z2, and P3Z3 have to 
update.  This task would be done separately for each piece of defective equipment based on the 





presented failure. Then the result from nodes PE and C could be transferred in the risk matrix to 
show the level of the risk. Figure 5.5 illustrates the outputs from the BN model when node P2Z2 is 
on present. 
 
Figure 5.5: Outputs from the BN model for node P2Z2 the state present as evidence (GeNIe academic version 3.9) 
 
It needs to pay attention When a piece of equipment has more than one failure, so each failure 
priority needs to find its present state on the node simultaneously. For example, in the case of the 
heater trace, both nodes P1Z2 and P3Z2 should be in the present state. 
The result of the analysis has been presented on the next page by table 5.1. 
At the start point, the analysis should identify the ignition risk for each failure. Therefore, findings 
from BN are transferred to the risk matrix, which is presented on section 4.4 figure 3.14. The risk 
matrix shows cell H16 for the heater trace, cell M9 for junction box tag number 8253-C11-5, and 
cell L4 for the rest. In the next step, the result of the risk matrix provides weight for every failure 
code. This weighting is based on EI (2008) recommendation: 
High risk=1 
Medium risk=0.5 
Low risk= 0.25 
Despite the faulty equipment number being five and the reject number was three, the sample is 
acceptable because of the low ignition risk. 
 
 
  Fire 0.002788645
  Present 0.006971612   EXP 0.002091484
  Absent 0.993028388   NonCon 0.995119872
Marginal probability distribution, Node P2Z2 present: Node C
Node PE






























S03T1 P3  




High 1 8284-JB2401 
 
T1A9 P1  
T1B11 P1  







Z P1  
SOLENOID S02T1 P3 Low 1 NO TAG  
Junction Box So2T1 P3 Low 
1 





Low  0.25 3 0.75  
Medium  0.5 1 0.5  
High  1 1 1  
        Total Faulty equipment  2.25  
        2.25<3 sample is acceptable   
Note: Definition of fault   
S02T1: Equipment Tag is missing (Regular equipment tag either on equipment or cable)  
S03T1: Ex label is missing (Manufacturer label with Ex information)  
T1A9: Lead cable into the HT box is not connected, loose in the box  
T1A11b: Loose nipple, not get tightened against nut due to corrosion  
T1A17: Electrical not connected  
T1B6a: Bonding is missing, not connected to the structure  
T1B11: Cables not in use are not correctly terminated  
Z: There are additional NON-EX integrity faults  
  
 
To make the concept more precise, it could assume the same process for Zone 1. The same lot size 
with the same faulty codes. The result of the analysis could be as follow. The new evidence 
indicates cell H20 for the heater trace, cell H16 for junction box tag number 8253-C11-5, and cell 
M12 for the rest. The result is shown in table 5.2. 






























S03T1 P3  




High 1 8284-JB2401 
 
T1A9 P1  
T1B11 P1  







Z P1  
SOLENOID S02T1 P3 Medium 1 NO TAG  
Junction Box So2T1 P3 Medium 
1 




Result :  
Low 0.25 0 0  
Medium 0.5 3 1.5  
High 1 2 2  
        Total Faulty equipment  3.5  
        3.5>3 sample is not acceptable   
Note: Definition of fault   
S02T1: Equipment Tag is missing (Regular equipment tag either on equipment or cable)  
S03T1: Ex label is missing (Manufacturer label with Ex information)  
T1A9: Lead cable into the HT box is not connected, loose in the box  
T1A11b: Loose nipple, not get tightened against nut due to corrosion  
T1A17: Electrical not connected  
T1B6a: Bonding is missing, not connected to the structure  
T1B11: Cables not in use are not correctly terminated  
Z: There are additional NON EX integrity faults  
 
As the result shows, based on the new evidence, the sample is not acceptable. This new sample 
needs remedial action. The critical point is that the BN model has met the RBI principle, which 
required increasing inspection for high-risk equipment to ensure safety level. On the other hand, it 
makes balance in the cost by reducing the inspection for low-risk equipment. 





Chapter 6. Conclusion and recommendation 
 
Different risk-based inspection approaches have been accepted and developed in the petroleum 
industry in the past few years. These approaches have been used to determine the probability of 
failure and its consequences; then, the result optimizes the inspection intervals. However, there is 
not any integrated approach for RBI. In this research, to minimize the inspection cost, a new risk-
based methodology has been developed by employing the Bayesian Network. Therefore, this study 
started with the most common risk analysis techniques such as fault tree and event tree and then 
tried to present a Bayesian network that can deal better with uncertainty. 
The main objective of the thesis is to apply the result of BN to identification a risk-based strategy 
for ex electrical equipment in the offshore industry. Therefore, data has been collected from the 
rowan Viking rig. Then the BN has been developed based on the data from the case study and other 
relevant standards and regulations. The results of the analysis showed that applying a Bayesian 
network by sampling inspection could meet the RBI requirement. Still, there is some issues 
according to the result. 
 
Figure 6.1: The sensitivity analysis for the end model (GeNIe academic version 3.0) 





The main challenge for the model was converting qualitative risk zones to appropriate quantitative 
parameters for use in a BN. When the sensitivity analysis has been done for the end model (figure 
6.1), still the target nodes C and PE influence significantly by a basic node of zones. 
On the other hand, the inspection data does not explain how the zones are divided. In the inspection 
data, most of the equipment is installed in the safe zone. Based on the IEC 60079-17 definition, 
there is no chance for an explosive atmosphere in the safe area. Therefore, the risk of ignition does 
not make sense for these areas. In addition, the standards explain clearly that in the offshore 
operation process, it is essential to consider all safe zone as zone 2. 
Consequently, this study suggests more precautionary approach regard to zone classification for 
the inspection data set because the probability of ignition of flammable releases is a critical factor 
in determining the risk of ignition. 
Another challenge for the model was modeling the consequences node. Unfortunately, there is not 
sufficient data for the consequences of ignition, and the current data are sparse. Many risk-based 
techniques convert COP to monetary value. In the lack of systematic data, COF evaluation could 
be more based on analyzer taste and knowledge. The existing approach could not provide an 
integrated view of the COF value.
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